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Forwarded from IEPS-L by Ross Emmett
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Here are the details of the International Economics and Philosophy Society
Session at the Central Division APA Conference at the Palmer House Hilton,
Chicago. At the end of this message you will also find the abstracts of
the two papers to be presented.
Best, Julian Lamont
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Thursday, April 25
5.15-7.15 pm
Private Dining Room #8
Chair: Bernard Baumrin
Speaker: Thomas Christiano, "Political Equality and The Political Power in
Property Rights"
Commentator: John Christman
Speaker: Clark Wolf, "Markets, Justice, And The Interests Of Future
Generations"
Commentator: Wilfried Ver Eecke
Affiliations:
Bernard Baumrin, City University of New York, The Graduate School and
Lehman College
Thomas Christiano, University of Arizona, Tucson
John Christman, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Wilfried Ver Eecke, Georgetown University
Clark Wolf, University of Georgia, Athens
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Thomas Christiano, "Political Equality and The Political Power in
Property Rights"
Abstract: Many social scientists and philosophers have noted the
constraints that capital imposes on the ability of democracies to achieve
their aims. And this issue grows in significance as capital becomes
increasingly mobile throughout the globe. What theorists have not
discussed with much precision or depth are the implications of this
phenomenon for the realization of the norm of political equality which
lies at the heart of democratic principles. I distinguish this issue from
that of defining an egalitarian process where each can participate equally
in deliberation and in making decisions. Even under these egalitarian
conditions, capitalists and other specially placed citizens can block the
achievement of goals decided on by the democratic process and can force
the process to revise its goals in anticipation of these constraints. The
reactions of most theorists are either to ignore the interactions between
the powers of capital and democracy or to assert that these activities of
capitalist constitute a clear exercize of political power and a serious
threat to democratic norms. In my paper, I clarify the many issues that
underlie this debate and show that a middle ground between the extreme
responses above is the appropriate analysis of the implication of the
independent powers of capital for political equality.
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Clark Wolf, "Markets, Justice, And The Interests Of Future
Generations"
Abstract: This paper considers the extent to which market institutions
respond to the needs and morally significant interests of future
generations. First, I situate the problem within a theory of
intergenerational justice. I argue that a theory of intergenerational
justice would consider whether the institutions of society suffice to
provide for the legitimate claims and needs of present persons while also
giving future persons their due. Many resource economists and "free
market environmentalists" have argued that free market institutions will
provide for the interests of the future in an ideal way. I argue that
such optimism is unsupported by the arguments that are typically offered
in defense of this optimistic claim.
First, I briefly examine the traditional market theorems, and present a
presumptive case in favor of the claim that markets will not protect the
interests of the future. Even perfectly frictionless markets that achieve
pareto optimal distributions at every point in time might, over time, lead
to swift resource depletion and inter-temporal disaster. This is true in
part because (as E.J. Mishan has argued) markets may not yeild
intertemporally pareto optimal outcomes even if outcomes are pareto
optimal at every time slice, but also because intertemporal pareto
optimality is consistent with intertemporal disaster. Thus, the
conception of 'optimum' used is too weak to carry any normative weight
whatsoever.
Second, I consider three attempts to rebut the _prima_facie_ case described
above: I consider (i) Harold Hotelling's argument that rational monopolists
who have charge of a finite stock of nonrenewable resource will release those
resources to the market at optimal rates. (ii) Julian Simon & Jan Narveson's
optimistic argument that human ingenuity will adequately respond to scarcity,
so that over time, substitute technologies will take over when scarcity sets
in. (iii) David Gauthier's argument that the interests of future generations
are adequately represented in the terms of current rational agreements and
contracts.
Each of these arguments, if successful, would imply that there is no need
to make provisions for the interests of the future: free markets will do
it by themselves. If I am correct in my argument that none of these
arguments is successful, this has serious implications for a theory of
intergenerational justice. Given important grounds for pessimism about
_non_-market solutions to such problems, there seems to be little room for
hope that we can successfully preserve productive resources that future
generations will need to satisfy their basic needs. I tentatively
suggest, in the end, where such hope resides.
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