Wed Jun 3 11:34:04 EDT 1998
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EDITOR'S NOTE
The following contains one message originally posted on H-World
(4). Originally submitted to H-WORLD June 1, first posted here.
From: Pat Manning, Northeastern University
manning at neu.edu
This discussion of world economic history has been pathbreaking, yet has
remained largely bipolar. Landes emphasized the rising economic strength
of Europe, Frank emphasized the continuing economic power of China, and the
resulting debate has focused on upholding one or another of these
approaches. There have been exceptions: Rebecca Menes introduced some
useful statements of counterfactuals, and Tom Jackson gave a really helpful
view of the world from Warrington on the Mersey. Gunder Frank has called
for a more global approach to the world economy, and he and Alan Taylor are
now engaged in a discussion of what that means in specific terms.
Now the editors of Eh.Res have drawn on recent discussion to propose a
research focus on the "bifurcation" of the world economy after 1800, and on
the reasons for British industrial primacy. This approach sustains the
implicit assumption that large areas of the world -- Africa, for instance
-- may be neglected in order to simplify and theorize the world. Such
simplification, however, moves our modeling away from interactive, systemic
approaches and back to diffusionist reasoning and to positivistic,
cause-and-effect models. So while all of us have, in principle, upheld the
notion that we are analyzing global economic change, in practice the
discussion has focused more on two great nodes (and the interplay between
them) than on the functioning of the global economic system as a whole.
I want to introduce a perspective from the west coast of Africa into the
discussion, and for three reasons. First, because I think the region has
significance in its own right; second, to suggest that our discussion
should focus less on dominance and more on interplay; and third, to
indicate some steps on the way toward an interactive analysis.
In a 1982 book I constructed estimates of the per capita value of exports,
per capita GDP, and growth rates of each for the Bight of Benin (the
kingdom of Dahomey and surrounding areas, now the southern portion of the
Republic of Benin) by decennium from 1640 to 1960, working from volumes and
prices of exports of slaves and oil palm products.(1) I compared these to
figures for Great Britain, the U.S., Mexico and Brazil. For the Bight of
Benin itself, the result suggested long-term economic growth (at a rate of
about 1% per year), but with significant decline as a result of the cost of
slave exports (1720-1830), and a subsequent decline in the 20th century as
a result of the fiscal drain of French colonialism. More to the point for
this discussion, the Bight of Benin's per capita export revenue was similar
to that for Britain in the early 18th century (at the peak of slave
exports), and fell behind thereafter.
Combining my results with those of other scholars, I would offer the
following narrative for the west coast of Africa. The region grew rapidly
in the early 17th century, partly as a result of external trade. For Gold
Coast, Ray Kea has documented a society of many towns and busy commerce, on
a virtually protoindustrial scale(2). Then late in the 17th century, as
slave trade expanded and slave prices rose rapidly, warfare expanded in
Gold Coast and neighboring Bight of Benin. The towns of the Gold Coast
gave way to dispersed settlement. The previous export of gold was
succeeded by a reversal of gold flows, as slaves were sold for Brazilian
gold. In the Bight of Benin, slaves were paid for in large part by cowrie
shell currency brought from the Maldives via Amsterdam.(3)
In the late eighteenth century, expanding slave trade brought declining
population to the Western Coast of Africa generally; the short-term
windfalls now gave way to general economic decline.(4) Still, substantial
artisanal production -- notably of textiles but also of metallic goods --
continued in the face of growing imports, as is indicated in John
Thornton's analysis of Central African textiles.(5) By the early 19th
century, the Bight of Benin had fallen far behind Britain in per capita
exports. West African states, such as the powerful Asante kingdom, were
in a position of developing their bureaucratic controls at a time they were
of declining global significance.(6) For Angola, Joseph Miller has traced
the downward spiral of the region in its connections to Brazil and to
Portugal.(7)
Slave exports from West Africa declined in the early 19th century, and the
subsequent rise in agricultural exports (peanuts, palm oil) led to decades
of rapid economic growth - with per capita incomes now similar to Mexico
and Brazil. (For Central Africa, however, slave exports continued to 1850,
and agricultural growth was delayed.) In the twentieth century, growth
slowed in the Bight of Benin, and per capita incomes fell below those of
Mexico and Brazil.
The lessons I would presume to draw from this instance are as follows: 1)
"bifurcation" -- the overall eclipse of other economies by Europe's at the
turn of the 19th century, is again confirmed; 2) long-term growth
nevertheless continued in at least some of the areas being eclipsed; 3)
timing of economic growth and decline varied significantly by region -
separating West from Central Africa and Africa from China; 4) these African
regions participated measurably in the world economy, so that developing
techniques for including them in the discussion may help in the elaboration
of properly interactive models.
On the other hand, after calling above for a more interactive approach, I
have still tended to tell one more regional story. How to make such
regional tales into a global analysis? Here are two rules that help: 1)
relate local developments to global developments, 2) make explicit
comparisons of linked regions. We still face the question of how best to
describe the various regional currents, and to develop out of them a model
for global interaction that goes beyond the reigning model of dominance and
diffusion. Empirical work will help in the development of theory.
(1) Patrick Manning, Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey,
1640-1960 (Cambrige, 1982)
(2) Ray A. Kea, Settlements, Trade and Politics in the Seventeenth Century
Gold Coast (Baltimore, 1982)
(3) Jan Hogendorn and Marion Johnson, Shell Money of the Slave Trade
(Cambridge, 1988)
(4) Patrick Manning, Slavery and African Life (Cambridge, 1990).
(5) John Thornton, "Precolonial African Industry and the Atlantic Trade,
1500-1800," African Economic History No. 19 (1990-91); see also
the commentaries in the same issue.
(6) Larry Yarak, Asante and the Dutch (Oxord, 1990)
(7) Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan
Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison, 1988)
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